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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is no gold standard for measurement and diagnosis of psychopathology. An
example of a gold standard is an answer sheet to a math exam. If the answers given by
a respondent differ from the sheet, the respondent made mistakes. The reason we can
treat this as a gold standard is that we have a strong believe in the correctness of
mathematical proof. In psychiatry and psychopathology there is no such answer sheet
and therefore no quick and easy way to ascertain whether the results of a test or a
diagnosis are right. If discrepancies arise between different diagnostic procedures there
is no final judgment to which both results can be compared to decide which one is
true.
This does not imply that all measures are equally important, useful or valid, nor
that the phenomena captured under the umbrella of psychopathology are not
disturbing. I assume that the concept psychopathology refers to real problems that can
be meaningfully communicated between people and influence the results obtained
from measurement instruments. That being said, we are far away from a clear and
certain understanding of what it is that we are measuring and communicating. In the
papers presented in this thesis I aimed to confront a few of these disturbing
uncertainties: (1) uncertainty about the latent structures underlying the covariances
between measures of psychopathology, (2) uncertainty about the estimation of these
covariances, (3) discrepancies between informants, and (4) the diagnostic concepts
used in clinical practice. Admittedly, these four topics cannot be dealt with in full depth
in a single thesis and the papers may elicit more questions than answers. However, I
hope the thesis also shows the interrelatedness of these issues and their importance
for applied psychological science. In the following I will shortly introduce each of these
four topics.
Latent structures underlying psychopathology
Mental disorders cannot be observed, but diagnostic concepts are derived from
ideas about (causal) associations between observations. Therefore diagnoses are
sometimes referred to as hypothetical constructs (Strauss & Smith, 2009).
Hypothetical emphasizes that we hypothesize that the terms refer to real attributes
(Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004), while the term construct refers to
the fact that we make them ourselves while developing our sciences and practices.
Some constructs are defined as dichotomies, which implies the hypothesis that the
attribute is either present or not. Some constructs are defined as ordinal or
continuous. In that case the attribute is hypothesized to be present in all people, albeit
in different quantities. Finally, we can imagine mixtures in which a construct may only
apply to subsets of people, but occur in different quantities within these people.
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Psychological constructs are often developed on the basis of covariances between
reported symptoms in a sample from the general population. The basic idea underlying
this approach is that differences between individuals (inter-individual differences) result
from the same underlying causal system. Differences in observed variables are assumed
to be caused by differences in latent variables related to these underlying causal
systems. For example, Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen (1999) hypothesize that
observed differences in reported emotions are caused by differences in the functioning
of two biological systems (Gray, 1990): the behavioral activation system (BAS) and
behavior inhibition system (BIS). Individual differences in the functioning of these two
systems would explain why persistently a two-dimensional structure of affect is found
in factor-analytic studies of differences in self-reported emotion. To be sure, the above
mentioned factor-analyses are only part of the argument for BIS and BAS. Latent
factors derived from statistical analysis cannot be directly interpreted as indicators of
existing phenomena, but are themselves in need of explanation.
With regard to psychopathology, the currently used Diagnostic Statistical Manual
(4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) provides diagnostic rules for research
and clinical practice that allow users to apply diagnostic constructs to individuals. The
validity of these constructs has been a continuous topic of debate among experts.
Particularly, some have argued that there is no strong support for the dichotomous
nature of many of the constructs and that the boundaries between constructs have
not been shown to ‘carve nature at its joints’ (Lilienfeld, Waldman, & Israel, 1994;
Waller, 2006). From a practical point of view it has been observed that many people
meet criteria for multiple diagnoses, which is generally referred to as comorbidity.
Given the problematic status of the validity of the dichotomous constructs, this
comorbidity should not necessarily be interpreted as the presence of two diseases
within the same individual (see Neale & Kendler, 1995). As an alternative some authors
have used factor-analysis to study the latent structure underlying the DSM-IV
comorbidity patterns (e.g. Vollebergh, et al., 2001). Also, authors have developed
questionnaires independent of the DSM-IV system and used factor-analysis to
investigate the structure of covariance between items on these questionnaires (e.g.
Achenbach, 1991a; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978; Hartman, et al., 1999). Many DSM-IV
and questionnaire based studies have resulted in a similar two-dimensional second-
order latent variable model that has been found for children and adolescents (e.g.
Lahey, et al., 2008), as well as adults (Krueger, Caspi, Moffitt, & Silva, 1998; Krueger,
Chentsova-Dutton, Markon, Goldberg, & Ormel, 2003). The term ‘second-order’ refers
to the fact that these two dimensions capture the covariance-structure of first-order
subscales, which capture the covariance between symptoms (i.e. cognitions, emotions,
behaviors). This model is generally referred to as the structure of Internalizing (INT)
and Externalizing (EXT) psychopathology. In my view the single most important
advantage of latent variable models is that they make a formal distinction between
latent variables and observed questionnaire responses. This also implies that observed
data can be used to compare alternative latent models, as will be done in chapter 2.
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Second, they capture multiple psychological concepts within the same analytic model.
Different psychological concepts (e.g. temperament and personality) have often been
treated in separate literatures in which the overlap with other constructs (e.g. mental
disorders) was neglected (Clark, 2005). This process can easily result in a multitude of
ill-understood concepts that cause more confusion than clarification of the latent
structure involved. Latent variable modeling of the covariance structure of multiple
constructs of psychopathology can be used to investigate both common and specific
features of these concepts. For example, the concept of a Broader Autism Phenotype
(BAP) has received much attention in the literature on autism and has been
conceptualized as a specific dimension or trait in the general population. In chapter 2 it
is shown that the problems related to this dimension can be adequately studied within
the framework of Internalizing and Externalizing psychopathology. This type of analysis
is useful in order to evaluate how the BAP-concept relates to other concepts of
psychopathology. A third advantage is that the variables in these models have been
constructed as dimensions. As will be argued in chapter 3 there are important
advantages to first develop a dimensional representation and only later introduce
categories within this dimensional framework.
Discrepancies in the estimation of association between measures
Latent structures of psychopathology, like the model of internalizing and
externalizing psychopathology, are generally derived from the covariance structure of
reported symptoms in a sample. This means that it is assumed that the covariances are
caused by individual differences in underlying psychopathology. However, estimations of
associations between variables may also be influenced by several methodological
biases. Specifically, sampling and measurement biases may influence the estimated
association between different reported emotional and behavioral problems. In chapter
5 it will be tested to what extent these biases influence the estimated association
between the internalizing and externalizing dimensions of psychopathology.
Discrepancies between informants
Symptoms of psychopathology are not directly observed by researchers or
diagnosticians. Furthermore, one of the key criteria of DSM-IV for the application of
any diagnosis is that the syndrome “… causes clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning” . That is,
we need to know not only what behaviors and emotions occur in daily life, but also
their impact on the person and the environment.  The researcher is therefore
dependent on informants, i.e. either self-report or reports of people related to the
subject. Either through interviews or questionnaires informants are asked to report
on the behaviors and emotions of the subject. This inevitably introduces informant-
specific sources of variance in questionnaire responses. The often low correlations (e.g.
r=.30; Achenbach, McConaughy, & Howell, 1987) between different informant reports
suggest powerful informant-specific influences. If different informant reports would
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reliably and validly measure one and the same attribute one would not expect such
low correlations. For this reason researchers have attempted to distinguish between
variance that is caused by characteristics of the subject and variance that is caused by
the specific informants being used. In this thesis several of these models are applied
and evaluated (chapter 4, 5, and 6).
It is important to realize that informant discrepancies do not necessarily indicate
influences of methodological factors. In chapters 4 to 6 multiple reasons will be
discussed why discrepancies may arise between informants. Of specific importance in
chapter 4 are differences in the context in which an informant observes the subject
and differences in the perspective by others and the self-perspective. These differences
are not well captured by the term bias as they refer to actual observations rather than
misrepresentation of observations. This does not mean that biases in observing and in
responding to questionnaires are absent. In the chapters of this thesis both substantive
and methodological reasons for the emergence of discrepancies will be discussed.
The creation of useful diagnostic language for clinical practice
Given the uncertain status of the latent models and hypothetical constructs of
psychopathology one may wonder whether and how psychological problems can be
meaningfully communicated among experts and between experts and non-experts.
The important critiques that have accumulated over the years with regard to the
dichotomies of DSM-IV suggest that this model may give a misleading impression of
knowledge about psychiatric disorders. The manual itself makes it explicit that “in
DSM-IV, there is no assumption that each category of mental disorder is a completely
discrete entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from other disorders or from no
mental disorder.” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) Nevertheless, the language
that is developed by strictly applying the diagnostic rules is one of discrete disorders
and ‘comorbidity’. Furthermore, in many countries practices have developed that
attach much status to DSM-IV dichotomous diagnoses which can influence treatment
and reimbursement. The implication is that a gap may grow between the apparently
solid categorical diagnostic language and the dimensional and uncertain knowledge
about the latent structure to which this language should refer.
There is no quick and easy way to bridge this gap. As already mentioned, there is
no gold standard to which we can refer for absolute measures and there is much
uncertainty about the validity of diagnoses made in clinical practice. In communicating
with clients in clinical practice it is nearly impossible to discuss all the subtle and less
subtle arguments for and against certain diagnostic approaches. Nevertheless, I think it
is crucial that a more nuanced and realistic diagnostic language be developed. In
chapter 3 a perspective is developed on how to create useful diagnostic language on
the basis of a dimensional framework of psychopathology. In the conclusion to this
thesis I discuss whether and how uncertainties about measurement and discrepancies
between informants can be incorporated into this diagnostic language.
